U.S. President Joe Biden greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a meeting during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Week in Woodside, Calif., on Nov. 15, 2023.
©Brendan SMIALOWSKI / AFP
Tensions
The world has been waiting, at least since the election of an independent president to lead Taiwan (Tsai Ing Wen in 2016), for East Asia to become the next theater of a large-scale war.
The world has been waiting, at least since the election of an independent president to lead Taiwan (Tsai Ing Wen in 2016), for East Asia to become the next theater of a large-scale war. It would oppose China, which has made the reunification of the island and the continent a necessity (before China’s centenary in 2049) for its foreign policy, and the United States, which cannot accept an annexation that would call into question its regional alliance system and furthermore their influence on a continent that drives the global economy (54% of GDP and 60% of global growth in 2024).
This expectation feeds the conviction of countless “realistic” observers of the Ukrainian conflict. In their eyes, Ukraine does not deserve support from the West, that is, from America, whose priorities must be found in Asia. America must prepare for the next war with China (2nd world GDP since 2010), not waste its time and weapons (five “bills” totaling $175 million since 2022) supporting Kiev, a peripheral conflict with Russia in decline (11th world GDP). Obama had made the “pivot” to Asia, Trump made China his designated opponent, Biden should take the choices of his predecessors.
However, this vision neglects the deeply Sino-American nature of the Ukrainian conflict. In many ways, Ukraine is a proxy war that the two capitals are already waging. Of course, neither of the two protagonists has any interest in admitting it, and the Westerners insist on their “non-belligerence”, as do the Chinese on their neutrality (kyiv also invites them to the “high-level” conference that will be organized soon in Swiss). But this estimate is a hallmark of the conflictual relationship between Beijing and Washington. During the Korean War, China only sent “volunteers” against American troops. After 1954, it supported North Vietnam without directly confronting the United States.
The Ukrainian conflict, taking place in a world where declarations of war are a thing of the past, is typical of this indirect Chinese power strategy. History will show if Vladimir Putin (in China on February 4, 2022, twenty days before the start of the “special military operation”) got the green light from Xi Jinping to invade his neighbor, but Russia’s dependence on China makes such a deal probable at best. Beijing maintains ambiguity: China allows some of its experts to predict a defeat for Russia (Feng Yujun, quoted by The Economist). Its diplomacy recalls its attachment to the principle of territorial integrity of states, the challenge of which would make Taiwan’s independence possible.
But in reality, China’s support is unequivocal. Beijing has everything to gain from the weakening of Russia, the great historical rival turned junior partner. The Chinese economy benefited from the reorientation of Russian exports (+26% in 2023, or $240 billion). China gains territorial advantages in the Far East (access to the port of Vladivostok). Chinese industry helps Russia develop components needed for its defense industry. China supports its partner in a conflict that does not cost it anything, either militarily (no direct commitment from the PLA) or economically (the attack on Taiwan would undoubtedly trigger a trade war with the US, its first partner with $400 billion in surplus).
Above all, Beijing sees the Ukrainian conflict as a turning point in the international order. In 2021, the pitiful US withdrawal from Afghanistan opened perspectives which restored the connection with the Taliban regime (welcoming an ambassador in Beijing in 2024 without formal recognition of the regime). The defeat of Ukraine, with the annexation of part of its territory, the abandonment of any idea of joining the EU or NATO, the arrival in power in Kiev of a conciliatory power with Moscow would be an even more serious blow to the prestige of the United States. It would pave the way for a geopolitical restructuring in Asia favorable to Chinese views.
But if China, without saying so, is waging a silent battle against the West in Ukraine, the United States is doing the same. Knowing Beijing’s double game, they have increased sanctions against Chinese companies participating in the Russian war effort (16 out of 60 in the latest sanctions regime announced by the State Department in May 2024). Protectionist policies targeting trade (increasing tariffs on electric cars from 25 to 100%) or Chinese companies (Tik Tok ban proposal from the House of Representatives) are part of the same logic.
Military support for Ukraine can thus be seen as a means of weakening Beijing. The Russian army suffered significant losses (150,000 dead soldiers according to France), more significant than the occupation of Afghanistan, where the United States had played a rather similar indirect strategy in the context of the Cold War. Washington’s calculation is that as long as Beijing must support Moscow in its military operations, China will not be tempted to open a new front by strengthening its fait accompli policy in the South China Sea or, simply, by embarking on to conquer Taiwan.
We can draw some lessons from this observation for the future. First among them, China’s weight in the Russian war effort is significant and makes the case of Iran or North Korea secondary. Other states help Moscow by continuing trade, but their role is more insignificant: China’s GDP is four times that of India. Any change in Russian policy in Ukraine will therefore be driven by Beijing. In this sense, Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Paris made sense. But given the marginal role of Europeans in Asia, it is hardly likely to change the CCP’s line.
So about the American involvement in Ukraine. It is seen in Washington not only as support for the international order, but also very realistically as a message of deterrence towards China. The vote of additional ($60 billion) extended US aid to Kiev for several years (at least until 2026). The turnaround for a fraction of the Republican Party bodes well for Ukrainians. It is also possible that Donald Trump was told that behind Moscow it was China that we were targeting. The war between China and the US will therefore not take place: it may already be underway.